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It is ubiquitous today for political theorists and philosophers to challenge 
traditional and dominant methods of the discipline. The book written by Michael 
Goodhart, Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, offers 
an original, radical and provocative approach to the problem of injustice. It has 
already received a review by Marcus Arvan, who indicated many problems there, 
although acknowledging its virtues. While considering the two problematic 
premises, which Goodhart purports to identify, as wrong, he supports what 
Goodhart calls three pathologies of ideal moral theory (the meaning of terms is 
to be explained below). However, Arvan criticizes Goodhart’s alternative bifocal 
approach and accuses him of relativism. Eventually, Arvan does not pay due 
attention to the rest of the book, which “suffers as a result” (Arvan, 2019). I will 
try to show the general picture of the book without focusing only on a single part 
while keeping as impartial as possible.
The main problem the book deals with is that so called Ideal Moral Theory 
(IMT), the dominant approach to political theory that cannot adequately 
address the problem of injustice in the real world. Following from that, the 
primary aim of the book, as Goodhart puts it, “is to do better with respect to 
injustice – to do better in making sense of it and in bringing theory to bear on 
it in ways that might help to advance the work of people struggling against 
injustices of all kinds” (р. 8). The book comprises three parts and seven 
chapters, where each part can be thought as a stage of critical reflection 
process. First, there is an attempt to “unthink” IMT by showing that it does 
not help to understand what injustice is. The alternative called the bifocal 
approach is presented in the second part. Finally, it is shown how the new 
approach can be adopted to combat injustice.
The first part of the book (Unthinking Ideal Moral Theory) is aimed to 
show that IMT is mistaken in its assumptions and premises, which are the 
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reason why it is unhelpful to address injustice. In the first chapter (The Trouble 
with Justice), Goodhart applies the procedure of estrangement or defamiliarization 
to look at IMT as at something less obvious or necessary. He explains that IMT is 
ideal for it depicts “justice in its pure or perfect form, uncontaminated by specific 
considerations of context and circumstance” (р. 25) and moral for it is “conceived 
as having categorical normative force – that is, as engendering or entailing binding 
duties and responsibilities” (рр. 25–26). He notes two troubling assumptions of 
IMT: “The first is that injustice can only be conceived as the absence or opposite 
of justice” (р. 27). To prove this position, Goodhart relies on Judith Shklar’s ideas. 
The second assumption is that it is supposed “to provide ‘ideal guidance’, by which 
is meant something like using ideal moral principles of justice to criticize existing 
social arrangements, to evaluate (normatively and comparatively) the status quo 
and possible alternatives to it, and to recommend reforms (policies, institutional 
changes) intended to make society more just (more like the ideal)” (р. 29).
The three pathologies “can be traced back to the two troubling assumptions at 
the heart of IMT” (р. 31). The first is theoretical paralysis, the inability to go beyond the 
debates about “which conception of justice should be adopted” (р. 32). The second 
pathology is subordination of politics to morality. The final pathology is distortional 
thinking that reveals that justice might function ideologically.
The second chapter (Barking Up the Wrong Trees) uses questions “about 
selection of principles of justice, about the scope of justice, and about the effects of 
the global order on the poor” (р. 47) to show that claims about justice and injustice 
are subjected to the pathologies that make justice claims inevitably ideological. 
Goodhart criticizes constructivist approaches on global normative theory, taking 
Gillian Brock’s initial choice situation (ICS) as an example. Then he analyzes various 
approaches justice, such as statist, cosmopolitan, hybrid and pluralist. Finally, 
he throws opposing views against each other regarding global poverty by taking 
accounts of Pogge and Risse. 
In the second part (Reconceptualizing the Problem), Goodhart proposes the 
bifocal approach, a radical alternative to IMT for addressing injustice. The third 
chapter (Getting Real?) reflects alternative approaches to IMT elaborated within 
realist political theory, particularly Sen’s realism-lite or nonideal realism (criticized 
for the similarity of the procedures he relies on with those of IMT), Williams’ liberal 
realism (criticized for conservatism), and Geuss’ critical realism. The approach 
Goodhart develops is realistic although not realist. He distances himself from realist 
political theory. In this sense, it seems closer to the approach David Miller applies 
in his book “Strangers in Our Midst” (Miller, 2016). Eventually, Goodhart criticizes 
realism for the wanting conception of normativity.
The fourth chapter (The Bifocal Approach) shows how realistic and normative 
frameworks can be combined into a single theoretical framework. The essence of 
the bifocal approach is the following: “it differentiates between but integrates two 
distinct tasks or functions of political theory: explanation and critique/ prescription” 
(р. 116). For this, Goodhart employs two lenses, namely, analytical and “partisan”. 
Using these lenses, all justice claims are viewed as ideological claims. He insists 
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on the bifocal approach “because it accommodates normative and prescriptive 
theorizing from inside an ideological perspective without confusing that work with an 
exercise in ideal moral theory” (р. 117). As a result, we can see the two-dimensional 
politics of injustice, which requires a special account of normativity irreducible to 
morality. Goodhart considers Philippa Foot’s conception of normativity as the 
valid one. He differentiates between the widespread categorical normativity and 
hypothetical normativity that is the basis of bifocal approach.
In the fifth chapter (A Democratic Account on Injustice), Goodhart applies the 
lenses of the bifocal approach to explain core democratic values and commitments 
(freedom and equality). He analyzes different types of power, democratic methods 
and knowledge, feminist epistemology, dialectical thinking and critical theory. 
Injustice is characterized as a “deformity in social relations where power creates 
or perpetuates subjection” (р. 154). Goodhart distinguishes three overlapping 
categories of injustice: domination, oppression, and exploitation. He also stands 
against a fixed definition of injustice in a diverse society because it can become a 
source of epistemic domination. After depicting his democratic account, the author 
differentiates himself from critical theorists.
The third part is focused on the practical differences bifocal approach makes, 
particularly on how political theorists can combat injustice and how we think of 
responsibility for injustice. In the sixth chapter (Political Theory and the Politics of 
Injustice), Goodhart holds that doing political theory is necessarily taking sides because 
“claims about justice and injustice are ideological claims” (р. 174). He holds that politics 
of injustice is a counterhegemonic politics, which means “struggles over injustice 
frequently require recontesting key elements of a hegemonic ideology, challenging the 
dominant meanings and interpretations that naturalize or normalize those injustices” 
(р. 180), and “politics that recognizes and acts on the realization that struggles over 
injustice are in large part struggles over values, ideas, and interpretations” (р. 181). 
Then Goodhart reflects upon collective political action, discursive politics, difference 
between articulation and justification and its relation to translation.
In the final chapter (Taking Responsibility for Injustice), Goodhart describes 
various ideas to consider the problem of systemic injustice “like hunger, poverty, 
and sweatshops – injustices originating in complex social systems, structures, and 
processes” (р. 206) and responsibility for it. By criticizing Iris Marion Young’s idea of 
structural injustice, he aims to show that philosophical (or moral) understanding of 
responsibility is misleading. To combat injustice, we need to think of responsibility 
as a political problem, which is shown by the bifocal approach. The author is inclined 
to understand taking responsibility as “to assume responsibility when one has 
no obligation to do so”, because “it provides us with a useful way to make sense of 
an important aspect of many people’s engagement in struggles against systemic 
injustice” (р. 222). In other words, Goodhart understands responsibility for injustice 
as a political problem in virtue of the contingency of our judgements and constant 
ideological contestation. 
To conclude, this book raises a serious problem of contemporary political theory 
by showing its one-sided character and inability to address the real-world political 
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issues. Goodhart’s idea creates more problems than solves and generates more 
questions than it is supposed to. Eventually, it is up to the reader to consider it either 
as merit or weakness. If someone is interested in the problem of injustice, this book 
can be a great companion to delve deeper into the problem. The work will be useful 
for those interested in IMT generally as well because it allows to look at its downsides. 
However, the reader is supposed to be properly prepared, for both the criticism and 
the argument of the book are built on colliding rival views and approaches.
References
Arvan, M. (2019). Book Review: Injustice: Political Theory for the Real 
World. Political Theory. DOI: 10.1177/0090591719836186  
Miller, D. (2016). Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration. 
Harvard University Press.
